Understanding Trust Assumptions for Attestation in Confidential Computing
Research output: Contribution to conferences › Paper › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
Despite its critical role, remote attestation in Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is poorly specified by Intel with some obvious flaws. We believe that it is part of Intel's strategic policy to create resistance to revealing trust assumptions of the process.
Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages | 49-50 |
| Number of pages | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2022 |
| Peer-reviewed | Yes |
Conference
| Title | 52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks 2022 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | DSN 2022 |
| Conference number | 52 |
| Duration | 27 - 30 June 2022 |
| Website | |
| Degree of recognition | International event |
| City | Baltimore |
| Country | United States of America |
External IDs
| unpaywall | 10.1109/dsn-s54099.2022.00028 |
|---|---|
| Scopus | 85136156106 |
| Mendeley | 6eb3367b-1083-3b57-9714-d22711fda5b3 |
| dblp | conf/dsn/Sardar22 |
Keywords
Research priority areas of TU Dresden
DFG Classification of Subject Areas according to Review Boards
Subject groups, research areas, subject areas according to Destatis
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Keywords
- confidentialcomputing cybersecurity cloudcomputingservices verification formalmethods formalverification attestation trustedexecutionenvironments trust security computing datasecurity privacy ccexplained intel iamintel, Resistance, Software, Security, Formal specifications, data privacy, securtity of data, software architecture, trusted computing, confidential computing, remote attestation, formal specification and verification, symbolic security analysis, ProVerif