Understanding Trust Assumptions for Attestation in Confidential Computing

Research output: Contribution to conferencesPaperContributedpeer-review

Contributors

Abstract

Despite its critical role, remote attestation in Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is poorly specified by Intel with some obvious flaws. We believe that it is part of Intel's strategic policy to create resistance to revealing trust assumptions of the process.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages49-50
Number of pages2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2022
Peer-reviewedYes

Conference

Title52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International conference on Dependable Systems And Networks (DSN2022) Baltimore USA
Conference number
Duration27 - 30 June 2022
Website
Degree of recognitionInternational event
LocationBaltimore, Maryland, USA
CityBaltimore
CountryUnited States

External IDs

unpaywall 10.1109/dsn-s54099.2022.00028
Scopus 85136156106
Mendeley 6eb3367b-1083-3b57-9714-d22711fda5b3
dblp conf/dsn/Sardar22

Keywords

Research priority areas of TU Dresden

DFG Classification of Subject Areas according to Review Boards

Subject groups, research areas, subject areas according to Destatis

Keywords

  • confidentialcomputing cybersecurity cloudcomputingservices verification formalmethods formalverification attestation trustedexecutionenvironments trust security computing datasecurity privacy ccexplained intel iamintel, Resistance, Software, Security, Formal specifications, data privacy, securtity of data, software architecture, trusted computing, confidential computing, remote attestation, formal specification and verification, symbolic security analysis, ProVerif