Understanding Trust Assumptions for Attestation in Confidential Computing
Publikation: Beitrag zu Konferenzen › Paper › Beigetragen › Begutachtung
Beitragende
Abstract
Despite its critical role, remote attestation in Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is poorly specified by Intel with some obvious flaws. We believe that it is part of Intel's strategic policy to create resistance to revealing trust assumptions of the process.
Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten | 49-50 |
| Seitenumfang | 2 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 1 Juni 2022 |
| Peer-Review-Status | Ja |
Konferenz
| Titel | 52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks 2022 |
|---|---|
| Kurztitel | DSN 2022 |
| Veranstaltungsnummer | 52 |
| Dauer | 27 - 30 Juni 2022 |
| Webseite | |
| Bekanntheitsgrad | Internationale Veranstaltung |
| Stadt | Baltimore |
| Land | USA/Vereinigte Staaten |
Externe IDs
| unpaywall | 10.1109/dsn-s54099.2022.00028 |
|---|---|
| Scopus | 85136156106 |
| Mendeley | 6eb3367b-1083-3b57-9714-d22711fda5b3 |
| dblp | conf/dsn/Sardar22 |
Schlagworte
Forschungsprofillinien der TU Dresden
DFG-Fachsystematik nach Fachkollegium
Fächergruppen, Lehr- und Forschungsbereiche, Fachgebiete nach Destatis
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
Schlagwörter
- confidentialcomputing cybersecurity cloudcomputingservices verification formalmethods formalverification attestation trustedexecutionenvironments trust security computing datasecurity privacy ccexplained intel iamintel, Resistance, Software, Security, Formal specifications, data privacy, securtity of data, software architecture, trusted computing, confidential computing, remote attestation, formal specification and verification, symbolic security analysis, ProVerif