SinClave: Hardware-assisted Singletons for TEEs

Research output: Contribution to conferencesPaperContributedpeer-review



For trusted execution environments (TEEs), remote attestation permits establishing trust in software executed on a remote host. It requires that the measurement of a remote TEE is both complete and fresh: We need to measure all aspects that might determine the behavior of an application, and this measurement has to be reasonably fresh. Performing measurements only at the start of a TEE simplifies the attestation but enables "reuse" attacks of enclaves. We demonstrate how to perform such reuse attacks for different TEE frameworks. We also show how to address this issue by enforcing freshness -- through the concept of a singleton enclave -- and completeness of the measurements. Completeness of measurements is not trivial since the secrets provisioned to an enclave and the content of the filesystem can both affect the behavior of the software, i.e., can be used to mount reuse attacks. We present mechanisms to include measurements of these two components in the remote attestation. Our evaluation based on real-world applications shows that our approach incurs only negligible overhead ranging from 1.03% to 13.2%.


Original languageEnglish
Number of pages13
Publication statusPublished - 2023


Title24th International Middleware Conference
Abbreviated titleMiddleware 2023
Conference number24
Duration11 - 15 December 2023
Degree of recognitionInternational event
LocationUniversity of Bologna

External IDs

Scopus 85179883981
ORCID /0000-0003-0768-6351/work/151433656


Research priority areas of TU Dresden

DFG Classification of Subject Areas according to Review Boards


  • Security & Privacy, Systems Security, Trusted Execution Environments