SinClave: Hardware-assisted Singletons for TEEs
Research output: Contribution to conferences › Paper › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
For trusted execution environments (TEEs), remote attestation permits establishing trust in software executed on a remote host. It requires that the measurement of a remote TEE is both complete and fresh: We need to measure all aspects that might determine the behavior of an application, and this measurement has to be reasonably fresh. Performing measurements only at the start of a TEE simplifies the attestation but enables "reuse" attacks of enclaves. We demonstrate how to perform such reuse attacks for different TEE frameworks. We also show how to address this issue by enforcing freshness -- through the concept of a singleton enclave -- and completeness of the measurements. Completeness of measurements is not trivial since the secrets provisioned to an enclave and the content of the filesystem can both affect the behavior of the software, i.e., can be used to mount reuse attacks. We present mechanisms to include measurements of these two components in the remote attestation. Our evaluation based on real-world applications shows that our approach incurs only negligible overhead ranging from 1.03% to 13.2%.
Details
Original language | English |
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Pages | 85-97 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Publication status | Published - 27 Nov 2023 |
Peer-reviewed | Yes |
Conference
Title | 24th International Middleware Conference |
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Abbreviated title | Middleware 2023 |
Conference number | 24 |
Duration | 11 - 15 December 2023 |
Website | |
Degree of recognition | International event |
Location | University of Bologna |
City | Bologna |
Country | Italy |
External IDs
Scopus | 85179883981 |
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ORCID | /0000-0003-0768-6351/work/151433656 |
Keywords
Research priority areas of TU Dresden
DFG Classification of Subject Areas according to Review Boards
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Keywords
- Security & Privacy, Systems Security, Trusted Execution Environments