SinClave: Hardware-assisted Singletons for TEEs

Publikation: Beitrag zu KonferenzenPaperBeigetragenBegutachtung

Beitragende

Abstract

For trusted execution environments (TEEs), remote attestation permits establishing trust in software executed on a remote host. It requires that the measurement of a remote TEE is both complete and fresh: We need to measure all aspects that might determine the behavior of an application, and this measurement has to be reasonably fresh. Performing measurements only at the start of a TEE simplifies the attestation but enables "reuse" attacks of enclaves. We demonstrate how to perform such reuse attacks for different TEE frameworks. We also show how to address this issue by enforcing freshness -- through the concept of a singleton enclave -- and completeness of the measurements. Completeness of measurements is not trivial since the secrets provisioned to an enclave and the content of the filesystem can both affect the behavior of the software, i.e., can be used to mount reuse attacks. We present mechanisms to include measurements of these two components in the remote attestation. Our evaluation based on real-world applications shows that our approach incurs only negligible overhead ranging from 1.03% to 13.2%.

Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten85-97
Seitenumfang13
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 27 Nov. 2023
Peer-Review-StatusJa

Konferenz

Titel24th International Middleware Conference
KurztitelMiddleware 2023
Veranstaltungsnummer24
Dauer11 - 15 Dezember 2023
Webseite
BekanntheitsgradInternationale Veranstaltung
OrtUniversity of Bologna
StadtBologna
LandItalien

Externe IDs

Scopus 85179883981
ORCID /0000-0003-0768-6351/work/151433656

Schlagworte

Forschungsprofillinien der TU Dresden

DFG-Fachsystematik nach Fachkollegium

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Schlagwörter

  • Security & Privacy, Systems Security, Trusted Execution Environments