Machine-Checking Unforgeability Proofs for Signature Schemes with Tight Reductions to the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Research output: Contribution to conferences › Paper › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
Digital signatures based on the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem often suffer from long signature sizes, and reductions made loose by the use of Pointcheval and Stern’s Forking Lemma. At EUROCRYPT 2003, Goh and Jarecki provided the first forking-free proof of unforgeability for a DL-based signature scheme—rooting its security in the hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. In this paper, we present and discuss the first machine-checked proofs for DL-based signature schemes reducing tightly to CDH, produced using EasyCrypt. We craft our proofs around a shim which reduces the local proof effort, and helps us identify patterns that can be easily adapted to similar tightly-secure DL-based schemes.
Details
Original language | English |
---|---|
Number of pages | 15 |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Peer-reviewed | Yes |
Conference
Title | 2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium |
---|---|
Abbreviated title | CSF 2021 |
Conference number | 34 |
Duration | 21 - 24 June 2021 |
Degree of recognition | International event |
Location | online |
City | Dubrovnik |
Country | Croatia |
External IDs
Scopus | 85125348176 |
---|
Keywords
Keywords
- cryptography, machine-checked-proofs, digital signatures, adaptation models, Computational modeling, computer securtity, Digital signatures, tightly-secure DL-based schemes, machine-checking unforgeability proofs, Computational Diffie-Hellman problem, Discrete Logarithm problem, long signature sizes