How We Respond to Robots and Whether It Matters Morally

Research output: Contribution to book/conference proceedings/anthology/reportConference contributionContributed



In the growing literature on the moral status of robots, authors such as Danaher, Coeckelbergh, and Sparrow have developed novel conceptions of moral status. In contrast to the standard emphasis on capacities, their accounts of moral status focus on human responses to robots. This paper provides both an analysis and critique of their accounts. First, it is argued that that all three authors endorse a response-dependence (RD) account of moral status. Second, it will be shown that these accounts suffer from three major problems. The conclusion is that an RD account is unsuitable to explain moral status and faces more problems than the capacity-based approach.


Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSocial Robots in Social Institutions
EditorsRaul Hakli, Pekka Mäkelä, Johanna Seibt
PublisherIOS Press
ChapterRelational Accounts
Pages498 - 507
Number of pages10
ISBN (electronic)ISSN 0922-6389
ISBN (print)ISSN 0922-6389
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2023

Publication series

SeriesFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

External IDs

ORCID /0000-0003-1654-1111/work/143497132