ENTANGLE: An Enhanced Logic-locking Technique for Thwarting SAT and Structural Attacks.
Research output: Contribution to book/Conference proceedings/Anthology/Report › Conference contribution › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
Among the SAT-resilient logic locking techniques, the Stripped-Functionality-Logic-Locking (SFLL) is the most promising solution which can guard the intellectual property against approximate, sensitization, SAT, and structural attacks which target Point-function techniques. However, even the SFLL technique has been shown to be vulnerable to a recent class of structural attacks that identify the perturbation logic. In this paper, we first categorize all possible classes of attacks on SFLL. Then we propose ENTANGLE a novel logic locking technique built upon SFLL that can resist all of these attacks, including the emerging ML-Based attacks. We test our technique against publicly available SFLL attacks. The implementation results show that ENTANGLE can secure large-sized industrial circuits with an average overhead of 11.6 percent and 9.1 percent for area and power, respectively.
Details
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI |
Pages | 147-151 |
Number of pages | 5 |
ISBN (electronic) | 9781450393225 |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Peer-reviewed | Yes |
External IDs
Scopus | 85131660951 |
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