ENTANGLE: An Enhanced Logic-locking Technique for Thwarting SAT and Structural Attacks.

Research output: Contribution to book/Conference proceedings/Anthology/ReportConference contributionContributedpeer-review

Contributors

Abstract

Among the SAT-resilient logic locking techniques, the Stripped-Functionality-Logic-Locking (SFLL) is the most promising solution which can guard the intellectual property against approximate, sensitization, SAT, and structural attacks which target Point-function techniques. However, even the SFLL technique has been shown to be vulnerable to a recent class of structural attacks that identify the perturbation logic. In this paper, we first categorize all possible classes of attacks on SFLL. Then we propose ENTANGLE a novel logic locking technique built upon SFLL that can resist all of these attacks, including the emerging ML-Based attacks. We test our technique against publicly available SFLL attacks. The implementation results show that ENTANGLE can secure large-sized industrial circuits with an average overhead of 11.6 percent and 9.1 percent for area and power, respectively.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGLSVLSI 2022 - Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2022
Pages147-151
Number of pages5
ISBN (electronic)9781450393225
Publication statusPublished - 6 Jun 2022
Peer-reviewedYes

External IDs

Scopus 85131660951

Keywords

Research priority areas of TU Dresden

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Keywords

  • boolean satisfiability (SAT), design-for-trust, logic locking, reverse engineering, structural attack