ENTANGLE: An Enhanced Logic-locking Technique for Thwarting SAT and Structural Attacks.
Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Konferenzbericht/Sammelband/Gutachten › Beitrag in Konferenzband › Beigetragen › Begutachtung
Beitragende
Abstract
Among the SAT-resilient logic locking techniques, the Stripped-Functionality-Logic-Locking (SFLL) is the most promising solution which can guard the intellectual property against approximate, sensitization, SAT, and structural attacks which target Point-function techniques. However, even the SFLL technique has been shown to be vulnerable to a recent class of structural attacks that identify the perturbation logic. In this paper, we first categorize all possible classes of attacks on SFLL. Then we propose ENTANGLE a novel logic locking technique built upon SFLL that can resist all of these attacks, including the emerging ML-Based attacks. We test our technique against publicly available SFLL attacks. The implementation results show that ENTANGLE can secure large-sized industrial circuits with an average overhead of 11.6 percent and 9.1 percent for area and power, respectively.
Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Titel | GLSVLSI 2022 - Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2022 |
| Seiten | 147-151 |
| Seitenumfang | 5 |
| ISBN (elektronisch) | 9781450393225 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 6 Juni 2022 |
| Peer-Review-Status | Ja |
Externe IDs
| Scopus | 85131660951 |
|---|
Schlagworte
Forschungsprofillinien der TU Dresden
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
Schlagwörter
- boolean satisfiability (SAT), design-for-trust, logic locking, reverse engineering, structural attack