Detectability of Denial-of-Service Attacks on Arbitrarily Varying Classical-Quantum Channels

Research output: Contribution to book/Conference proceedings/Anthology/ReportConference contributionContributedpeer-review

Contributors

  • Holger Boche - , Technical University of Munich, Munich Center for Quantum Science and Technology (MCQST), Ruhr University Bochum (Author)
  • Minglai Cai - , Technical University of Munich (Author)
  • H. Vincent Poor - , Princeton University (Author)
  • Rafael F. Schaefer - , University of Siegen (Author)

Abstract

Communication systems are subject to adversarial attacks since malevolent adversaries might harm and disrupt legitimate transmissions intentionally. Of particular interest in this paper are so-called denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which the jammer completely prevents any transmission. Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels, providing a suitable model to capture the jamming attacks of interest, are studied. Algorithmic detection frameworks are developed based on Turing machines and also Blum-Shub-Smale (BSS) machines, where the latter can process and store arbitrary real numbers. It is shown that Turing machines are not capable of detecting DoS attacks. However, BSS machines are capable thereof implying that real number signal processing enables the algorithmic detection of DoS attacks.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2021 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages912-917
Number of pages6
ISBN (electronic)978-1-5386-8209-8
Publication statusPublished - 12 Jul 2021
Peer-reviewedYes
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

SeriesIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
Volume2021-July
ISSN2157-8095

Conference

Title2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2021
Duration12 - 20 July 2021
CityVirtual, Melbourne
CountryAustralia

External IDs

ORCID /0000-0002-1702-9075/work/165878325