Detectability of Denial-of-Service Attacks on Arbitrarily Varying Classical-Quantum Channels

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Konferenzbericht/Sammelband/GutachtenBeitrag in KonferenzbandBeigetragenBegutachtung

Beitragende

  • Holger Boche - , Technische Universität München, Munich Center for Quantum Science and Technology (MCQST), Ruhr-Universität Bochum (Autor:in)
  • Minglai Cai - , Technische Universität München (Autor:in)
  • H. Vincent Poor - , Princeton University (Autor:in)
  • Rafael F. Schaefer - , Universität Siegen (Autor:in)

Abstract

Communication systems are subject to adversarial attacks since malevolent adversaries might harm and disrupt legitimate transmissions intentionally. Of particular interest in this paper are so-called denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which the jammer completely prevents any transmission. Arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels, providing a suitable model to capture the jamming attacks of interest, are studied. Algorithmic detection frameworks are developed based on Turing machines and also Blum-Shub-Smale (BSS) machines, where the latter can process and store arbitrary real numbers. It is shown that Turing machines are not capable of detecting DoS attacks. However, BSS machines are capable thereof implying that real number signal processing enables the algorithmic detection of DoS attacks.

Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Titel2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2021 - Proceedings
Herausgeber (Verlag)Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Seiten912-917
Seitenumfang6
ISBN (elektronisch)978-1-5386-8209-8
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 12 Juli 2021
Peer-Review-StatusJa
Extern publiziertJa

Publikationsreihe

ReiheIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
Band2021-July
ISSN2157-8095

Konferenz

Titel2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2021
Dauer12 - 20 Juli 2021
StadtVirtual, Melbourne
LandAustralien

Externe IDs

ORCID /0000-0002-1702-9075/work/165878325