Uncertain preferences in rational decision
Research output: Contribution to journal › Research article › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections.
Details
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 605-627 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Inquiry : an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| Publication status | Published - 2020 |
| Peer-reviewed | Yes |
External IDs
| Scopus | 85084387252 |
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| ORCID | /0000-0002-9962-2074/work/142234592 |