- Stockholm University
Sometimes it is permissible to infringe an individual’s rights against harm in order to save others from greater harm. It has been a matter of extensive debate if and by whom victims of permissible rights infringements are owed compensation. This chapter defends the view that the beneficiaries of a permissible rights infringement have special compensatory duties to the victim. The chapter identifies two desiderata that an account of the beneficiaries’ compensatory duties should meet, and shows that two existing defenses, the Beneficiary Pays Principle and the Fairness Principle, fail to satisfy them. The chapter argues that the beneficiaries owe compensation on grounds of the Special Duty Principle. Their compensatory duty is best understood as a special duty to alleviate harm. The duty is particularly stringent because victims and beneficiaries stand in a morally tragic relationship.
|Title of host publication||Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 8|
|Publication status||Published - 30 Dec 2021|