Modus Ponens Under the Restrictor View

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Abstract

There is a renewed debate about modus ponens. Strikingly, the recent counterexamples in Cantwell (Theoria, 74, 331–351 2008), Dreier (2009) and MacFarlane and Kolodny (The Journal of Philosophy, 107, 115–143 2010) are generated by restricted readings of the ‘if’-clause. Moreover, it can be argued on general grounds that the restrictor view of conditionals developed in Kratzer (1986) and Lewis (1975) leads to counterexamples to modus ponens (cp. Charlow Synthese, 190, 2291–2323 2013; Khoo Philosophical Studies, 166, 153–64 2013). This paper provides a careful analysis of modus ponens within the framework of the restrictor view. Despite appearances to the contrary, there is a robust sense in which modus ponens is valid, owing to the fact that conditionals do not only allow for restricted readings but have bare interpretations, too.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1001-1028
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Volume47
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2018
Peer-reviewedYes

External IDs

Scopus 85041504690
ORCID /0000-0002-9962-2074/work/142234594

Keywords