Knowledge and inquiry: The missing key for a knowledge-based decision theory
Research output: Contribution to journal › Research article › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
Fassio and Gao (2021) object to a knowledge-based decision theory on the ground that it cannot deal with unsuccessful inquiry. One way for inquiry to fail is not to know what one should know. If one’s inquiry fails in this way, is a subsequent choice in any way wrong when based on one’s limited actual knowledge? This paper discusses two strategies for dealing with this problem. On a first strategy, there is nothing wrong with such a choice (but something went wrong prior to one’s choice). On a second strategy, there is something wrong with one’s choice and a knowledge-based decision theory should require that one’s decisions be based on the knowledge one should have, not merely on the knowledge one actually has.
Details
Original language | English |
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Article number | 54 |
Journal | Asian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 2 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - 6 Oct 2023 |
Peer-reviewed | Yes |
External IDs
Scopus | 85183609857 |
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ORCID | /0000-0002-9962-2074/work/173987738 |
Keywords
DFG Classification of Subject Areas according to Review Boards
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Keywords
- Belief, Decision theory, Inquiry, Knowledge, Belief norm