Knowledge and inquiry: The missing key for a knowledge-based decision theory

Research output: Contribution to journalResearch articleContributedpeer-review

Abstract

Fassio and Gao (2021) object to a knowledge-based decision theory on the ground that it cannot deal with unsuccessful inquiry. One way for inquiry to fail is not to know what one should know. If one’s inquiry fails in this way, is a subsequent choice in any way wrong when based on one’s limited actual knowledge? This paper discusses two strategies for dealing with this problem. On a first strategy, there is nothing wrong with such a choice (but something went wrong prior to one’s choice). On a second strategy, there is something wrong with one’s choice and a knowledge-based decision theory should require that one’s decisions be based on the knowledge one should have, not merely on the knowledge one actually has.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Article number54
JournalAsian Journal of Philosophy
Volume2
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 6 Oct 2023
Peer-reviewedYes

External IDs

Scopus 85183609857
ORCID /0000-0002-9962-2074/work/173987738

Keywords

DFG Classification of Subject Areas according to Review Boards

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Keywords

  • Belief, Decision theory, Inquiry, Knowledge, Belief norm