In the middle of 2004, 31 former leading managers of Enron were accused of deception and the falsification of their balance sheets. Although the
results outlined by various committees of the US
government analyzing this case disclosed a wealth
of illegal practices and immoral behaviour among
Enron managers, former CEO Kenneth Lay denied any guilt in this context. Indeed, the results presented by the committees of investigation also showed huge deficits and a fundamental lack in the organizational structures of even those authorities that should have regulated this behaviour. Thus, in order to analyze the rise and fall of Enron, the focus of an objective investigation should not be laid only on the individual wrongdoing of Enron managers exclusively but also on the inefficiencies of the governance structures that enabled Enron’s managers to succeed in their dubious practices. Nevertheless, referring to the results disclosed in the case of Enron, the theses outlined in the following article is that governance structures as a tool to enforce managerial moral behaviour are too weak to suppress deviance.