Equity in network design and pricing: A discretely-constrained MPEC problem
Research output: Contribution to journal › Research article › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
This paper presents a novel transport network design approach that incorporates supply- and demand-side factors and emphasises equity as a key objective. The proposed model introduces a planning agency as the dominant player responsible for strategic decision-making to regulate the market and influence the behaviours of other participants. The paper addresses the complex dynamics between the planning agency and other players by formulating and solving a Stackelberg game within a network-constrained transport system. The proposed formulation is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) which can capture this interaction effectively. The MPEC is reformulated as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to solve the model by employing disjunctive constraints. To demonstrate the model's capabilities for policy analysis, we conduct numerical experiments on a toy network in Sydney. The computational models developed in this study provide insights into the impacts of different network designs on important aspects of transport systems, including equality in subsidy distribution, toll collection, and modal share among different user groups.
Details
Original language | English |
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Article number | 103800 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice |
Volume | 176 (2023) |
Publication status | Published - 10 Aug 2023 |
Peer-reviewed | Yes |
External IDs
ORCID | /0000-0002-2939-2090/work/161887584 |
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Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Keywords
- Mathematical problem with equilibrium constraint, Mixed integer linear programming, Pricing, Stackelberg game, Transport market