Chance and Actuality

Research output: Contribution to journalResearch articleContributedpeer-review

Abstract

The relation between chance and actuality gives rise to a puzzle. On the one hand, it may be a chancy matter what will actually happen. On the other hand, the standard semantics for ‘actually’ implies that sentences beginning with ‘actually’ are never contingent. To elucidate the puzzle, I defend a kind of objective semantic indeterminacy: in a chancy world, it may be a chancy matter which proposition is expressed by sentences containing ‘actually’. I bring this thesis to bear on certain counter-examples, proposed by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio, to Lewis' ‘principal principle’.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)105-129
Number of pages24
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Peer-reviewedYes

External IDs

Scopus 78650647036
ORCID /0000-0002-9962-2074/work/142234602

Keywords