An endogenous lottery-based incentive mechanism to promote off-peak usage in congested transit systems
Research output: Contribution to journal › Research article › Contributed › peer-review
Contributors
Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate a lottery-based revenue-neutral incentive mechanism to reduce the congestion in urban transportation systems. Specifically, we test the use of random lottery-based reward schemes to promote public transit usage during off‐peak periods. We derive the theoretical equilibrium for this decision-making game and test the validity of the proposed mechanism through monetized laboratory experiments. We use methods from experimental economics to investigate the behavioral assumptions within such an incentive-based mechanism. We find counterintuitive results where a Pure Nash Equilibrium explains behavior in one regime and Quantal Response Equilibrium explains behavior in another regime. Specifically, there is no shift to off-peak periods when the expected value of traveling in the off-peak is less than that at peak, which is explained by a Pure Nash Equilibrium. However, there is a substantial shift to the off-peak period when the expected value of traveling in the off-peak is larger than that of the peak, but much less than that predicted by a Pure Nash Equilibrium. The Quantal Response Equilibrium performs reasonably well in this condition, and we conclude that risk attitudes play a significant role in explaining behavior in lottery-based incentive mechanisms. This study, which relies on the gamification of travel behavior, finds that the proposed mechanism can provide a sustainable shift in users’ choices.
Details
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 46-55 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Transport policy |
Volume | 46 |
Publication status | Published - 1 Feb 2016 |
Peer-reviewed | Yes |
Externally published | Yes |
External IDs
ORCID | /0000-0002-2939-2090/work/141543916 |
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Keywords
Sustainable Development Goals
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Keywords
- Experimental economics, Gamification, Incentive mechanism, Lottery, Transit