A Last-Level Defense for Application Integrity and Confidentiality

Research output: Contribution to conferencesPaperContributedpeer-review

Contributors

Abstract

Our objective is to protect the integrity and confidentiality of ap-
plications operating in untrusted environments. Trusted Execution
Environments (TEEs) are not a panacea. Hardware TEEs fail to
protect applications against Sybil, Fork and Rollback Attacks and,
consequently, fail to preserve the consistency and integrity of ap-
plications. We introduce a novel system, LLD, that enforces the
integrity and consistency of applications in a transparent and scal-
able fashion. Our solution augments TEEs with instantiation control
and rollback protection. Instantiation control, enforced with TEE-
supported leases, mitigates Sybil/Fork Attacks without incurring
the high costs of solving crypto-puzzles. Our rollback detection
mechanism does not need excessive replication, nor does it sacrifice
durability. We show that implementing these functionalities in the
LLD runtime automatically protects applications and services such
as a popular DBMS.

Details

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - 4 Dec 2023
Peer-reviewedYes

Conference

Title2023 IEEE/ACM 16th International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing
Abbreviated titleUCC 2023
Conference number16
Duration4 - 7 December 2023
Website
Degree of recognitionInternational event
CityTaormina (Messina)
CountryItaly

External IDs

Scopus 85191660102

Keywords

Research priority areas of TU Dresden

DFG Classification of Subject Areas according to Review Boards

Subject groups, research areas, subject areas according to Destatis

Keywords

  • Cloud computing, Computer systems organization, Distributed systems security, Intel SGX, Security and privacy, Sybil Attack, sybil attack, cloud computing