Is Moral Status Done with Words? A Reply to Coeckelbergh’s Performative View of Moral Status

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftForschungsartikelBeigetragenBegutachtung

Beitragende

Abstract

This paper critically examines Coeckelbergh’s (2023) performative view of moral status. Drawing parallels to Searle’s social ontology, two key claims of the performative view are identified: (1) Making a moral status claim is equivalent to making a moral status declaration. (2) A successful declaration establishes the institutional fact that the entity has moral status. Closer examination, however, reveals flaws in both claims. The second claim faces a dilemma: individual instances of moral status declaration are likely to fail because they do not conform to established moral discourse conventions, and reliance on declarations becomes both unnecessary and implausible for explaining widespread collective recognition of moral status. As for the first claim, accepting it undermines the potential for meaningful moral disagreement. As a remedy, this paper proposed a shift in perspective: interpreting moral status claims as assertions rather than declarations. This refined perspective provides a more plausible framework for understanding moral status and avoids the pitfalls associated with the performative view.
Titel in Übersetzung
Wird moralischer Status durch Sprechakte erzeugt?
Eine Antwort auf Coeckelberghs Performative Theorie des Moralischen Status

Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Aufsatznummer10
Seitenumfang11
FachzeitschriftEthics and Information Technology
Jahrgang26 (2024)
Ausgabenummer1
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 6 Feb. 2024
Peer-Review-StatusJa

Externe IDs

ORCID /0000-0003-1654-1111/work/162845443
Scopus 85187162606

Schlagworte

Schlagwörter

  • Coeckelbergh, Declaration, Moral Status, Performativity, Searle, Speech Act Theory

Bibliotheksschlagworte