Actors' roles in forest landscape restoration (FLR) have gained scientific traction, although there is a lack of clarity on the link between actors' interests, power, and institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. We used actor-centred power and endogenous-cum-exogenous institutional analytical lenses to determine the effects of actors' interests and power elements on institutional compliance in rural Cameroon's FLR. We used interviews, focus group discussions, household surveys, and non-participant observations to obtain data for this study. The logistic regression and content analyses revealed that exogenous actors (e.g., forestry officials, sub-divisional councils officials) are more interested in the ecological and political benefits of FLR, while endogenous actors–traditional leaders, family heads, and ordinary community members–focus more on sociocultural and economic benefits. The common power elements that actors use to shape the behaviours of other actors when pursuing their interests are dominant information, coercion, and disincentives. Incentive measures are rarely employed. However, coercive and disincentive measures, especially by exogenous actors, often lead to non-compliance with institutional arrangements. In contrast, dominant information and incentives foster partial or full compliance. By establishing the variations in the effects of actors' power on institutional compliance, the study contributes to governance scholarship by demonstrating the need to move beyond the rigid dichotomy between actor-centred and institutionalist perspectives–a divide that characterises the classical structure–agency theoretical debate. FLR policies should emphasise leveraging the mutual interests of all actors, enhancing incentives, and minimising coercion and disincentives. Future studies should assess the influence of institutions on actors' engagement in FLR-related practices.