State bureaucratic settings and associated governance patterns have an enormous impact on the planning and implementation of a country's climate development policy. Contextually, a typical superior bureaucratic framework with its decision-making power centred on climate adaptation projects funding prevails in Bangladesh. This paper deploys the concepts of Weberian bureaucracy and super-bureaucracy and its governance pattern to explore the power attributes of climate bureaus and associated bureaucratic practices and decision-making behaviour regarding adaptation funding in climate adaptation governance. The study employs all climate adaptation development projects (n = 573) financing in Bangladesh. The analysis finds that the general administration cadre employees rather than technical professionals are involved in multiple decision-making processes, including appraisal and approval and monitoring and evaluating projects holding powerful pivotal positions both centrally and locally. These super bureaus also expand their power resources in climate adaptation policy by governing big adaptation projects, keeping the project director position, and approving the said position. The power capabilities and interests of the super-bureaus accrue by creating new climate institutions too. The decision-making behaviour and governance pattern underpin a state of super-bureaucracy, which are not supportive enough of innovative policy-making through inclusive participation and collective decision-making for governing dynamic climate adaptation policy.