Detecting Heap Smashing Attacks Through Fault Containment Wrappers
Publikation: Beitrag zu Konferenzen › Paper › Beigetragen › Begutachtung
Beitragende
Abstract
Buffer overflow attacks are a major cause of security breaches in modern operating systems. Not only are overflows of buffers on the stack a security threat, overflows of buffers kept on the heap can be too. A malicious user might be able to hijack the control flow of a root-privileged program if the user can initiate an overflow of a buffer on the heap when this overflow overwrites a function pointer stored on the heap. The paper presents a fault-containment wrapper which provides effective and efficient protection against heap buffer overflows caused by C library functions. The wrapper intercepts every function call to the C library that can write to the heap and performs careful boundary checks before it calls the original function. This method is transparent to existing programs and does not require source code modification or recompilation. Experimental results on Linux machines indicate that the performance overhead is small.
Details
Originalsprache | Englisch |
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Seiten | 80-89 |
Seitenumfang | 10 |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2001 |
Peer-Review-Status | Ja |
Konferenz
Titel | 20th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems |
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Kurztitel | RELDIS 2001 |
Veranstaltungsnummer | |
Dauer | 31 Oktober 2001 |
Bekanntheitsgrad | Internationale Veranstaltung |
Ort | |
Stadt | New Orleans |
Land | USA/Vereinigte Staaten |
Externe IDs
Scopus | 0035195201 |
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Schlagworte
Forschungsprofillinien der TU Dresden
DFG-Fachsystematik nach Fachkollegium
Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung
Schlagwörter
- Fault detection, Buffer storage, Security, Boffer overflow, operating systems, Libraries, FAult tolerant systems, Debugging, Protection, Linux, buffer storage, computer crime, C language, program diagnostics, heap smashing attack detection, fault containment wappers, buffer overflow attacks, Security breaches, modern operating systems, security threat, malicious user, control flow, root-privileded program, function pointer, fault-containment wrapper, heap buffer overflows, C library functions, function call, boundary checks, Linux machines, performance overhead