Climate Delegates' Views on the Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Under the Paris Agreement

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Forschungsartikel › Beigetragen › Begutachtung

Beitragende

Abstract

The Paris Agreement establishes a bottom-up global action plan with the aim of limiting global warming to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels, where countries should pledge Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of the highest possible ambition. The design of the agreement gives national authorities the freedom to decide on their own commitments and contains a dynamic component, the ratchet-up mechanism (RM), mandating periodic increase of the NDCs. Our survey of the UNFCCC CoP24 delegates investigates to what extent policymakers support the RM's effectiveness in achieving the climate targets of the Paris Agreement and examines the individual and country characteristics that influence their opinions. Although previous laboratory experiments highlighted limitations in the effectiveness of the RM, our findings indicate that actual climate delegates express support for the RM as a tool to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. In particular, support is significant among delegates from low-income countries, delegates with stronger climate risk perceptions, individuals who view the Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) as cost-effective instruments, those exhibiting greater technological optimism, as well as delegates who perceive less influence from industrial manufacturing interests. Our results complement laboratory studies by identifying real-world factors that may enhance international climate cooperation.

Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
FachzeitschriftGlobal Policy
PublikationsstatusElektronische Veröffentlichung vor Drucklegung - 29 Juli 2026
Peer-Review-StatusJa

Externe IDs

Scopus 105046104090

Schlagworte

Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Schlagwörter

  • NDC, Paris Agreement, UNFCCC delegates, climate ambition, ratchet-up mechanism