

Privacy-Preserving Ontology Publishing: The Case of Quantified ABoxes w.r.t. a Static Cycle-Restricted \mathcal{EL} TBox

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Dataset Rules
(qABox) (\mathcal{EL} TBox)



Privacy policy
(a set of \mathcal{EL} concepts)

Quantified ABox: $\exists X.A$

(ABox with atomic assertions, individuals, and existentially quantified variables)

$\exists\{x\}.\{relative(BEN, x), Actor(x), spouse(x, JERRY), Comedian(JERRY)\}$


\mathcal{EL} TBox \mathcal{T} :

$\{Comedian \sqsubseteq Actor\}$

Policy \mathcal{P} :

$\{\exists relative.(Actor \sqcap \exists spouse.Actor)\}$

Policy-Compliance w.r.t. Static \mathcal{EL} TBoxes



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
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Policy \mathcal{P} :


$\{\exists relative.(Actor \sqcap \exists spouse.Actor)\}$

*BEN is an instance of the policy w.r.t. $\exists X.A$ and $\mathcal{T} \Rightarrow$ **not compliant!***

Optimal Compliant Anonymizations



Optimal Compliant Anonymizations



- ▶ *being **optimal**: not strictly entailed by the other compliant anonymizations
- ▶ **Cycle-restricted TBoxes** are considered:
 $no\ C \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{T}} \exists w.C$ for each concept C and each non-empty word $w \in \Sigma_R^*$
- ▶ **Canonical compliant anonymizations** $\exists Y.\mathcal{B}$: a class of anonymizations covering all optimal compliant anonymizations

How to Compute A Canonical Compliant Anonymization

1. **Saturate the qABox** ($\exists X.\mathcal{A} \Rightarrow \text{sat}^{\mathcal{T}}(\exists X.\mathcal{A})$)
Saturation always terminates for cycle-restricted TBoxes

How to Compute A Canonical Compliant Anonymization

1. **Saturate the qABox** $(\exists X.\mathcal{A} \Rightarrow \text{sat}^{\mathcal{T}}(\exists X.\mathcal{A}))$
Saturation always terminates for cycle-restricted TBoxes
2. **Create copies** $y_{u,\mathcal{K}}$ **of each object** u of the $\text{sat}^{\mathcal{T}}(\exists X.\mathcal{A})$ s.t.
 - ▶ each $y_{u,\mathcal{K}}$ is a variable in $\exists Y.\mathcal{B}$
 - ▶ $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \text{Atoms}(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{T})$ is a **repair type** that specifies which instance relationships that want to be removed by $\exists Y.\mathcal{B}$
($C \in \mathcal{K}$ implies $(\exists X.\mathcal{A})^{\mathcal{T}} \models C(u)$)

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($C \in \mathcal{K}$ implies $(\exists X.\mathcal{A})^{\mathcal{T}} \models C(u)$)
3. **Define a compliance seed function (csf)** s that assigns each individual to a repair type s.t.
 - ▶ for each $P \in \mathcal{P}$ with $\text{sat}^{\mathcal{T}}(\exists X.\mathcal{A}) \models P(a)$, the repair type $s(a)$ contains an atom subsuming P
 - ▶ s is further used to **induce** $\exists Y.\mathcal{B}$, e.g., create assertions for $\exists Y.\mathcal{B}$ s.t. $C \in \mathcal{K}$ implies $\exists Y.\mathcal{B} \not\models C(y_{u,\mathcal{K}})$

Theorem (ISWC '20, CADE '21)

There is an algorithm to compute the set of all optimal compliant anonymizations of $\exists X.\mathcal{A}$ w.r.t. \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{T} that

- ▶ is deterministic and runs in exponential time, and
(*the number of seed functions and variables is exponential*)
- ▶ has access to an NP-oracle
(*remove the non-optimal anonymizations*)

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Can we improve the complexity?

Smaller/Optimized Compliant Anonymizations

- ▶ The number of variables in canonical anonymizations is always exponential
- ▶ Start with a csf, and then **only introduce necessary variables** stepwise

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
- ▶ is deterministic and runs in exponential time, and
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Theorem (CADE '21)

Each optimized compliant anonymization induced by a csf s is **equivalent** to the corresponding canonical compliant anonymization induced by s

Implementation: <https://github.com/de-tu-dresden-inf-lat/abox-repairs-wrt-static-tbox>.

Safety for Singleton Policies and Without TBoxes



Dataset $\exists X.A$:


$\exists \emptyset. \{father(BEN, JERRY), Comedian(JERRY)\}$

Policy \mathcal{P} :

$\{Comedian \sqcap \exists father.Comedian\}$

No instance of the policy concept w.r.t. the dataset

Safety for Singleton Policies and Without TBoxes



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
$\{Comedian \sqcap \exists father.Comedian\}$

Attacker $\exists Y.B$ knows:

$\exists \emptyset. \{Comedian(BEN)\}$

No instance of the policy concept w.r.t. the attacker's knowledge

Safety for Singleton Policies and Without TBoxes



Dataset $\exists X.A:$

$\exists \emptyset. \{father(BEN, JERRY), Comedian(JERRY)\}$

Policy $\mathcal{P}:$

$\{Comedian \sqcap \exists father.Comedian\}$

Attacker $\exists Y.B$ knows:

$\exists \emptyset. \{Comedian(BEN)\}$

*BEN is an instance of the policy concept w.r.t. the dataset and the attacker's knowledge \Rightarrow the dataset is **compliant with**, but **not safe** for the policy!*

Characterization of Safety (SAC '21)

$\exists X. \mathcal{A}$ is safe for $\{P\}$ iff for each individual a ,

- ▶ if $A \in \text{Atoms}(\{P\})$, then $A(a) \notin \mathcal{A}$
- ▶ if $r(a, u) \in \mathcal{A}$ and $\exists r.D \in \text{Atoms}(\{P\})$, then there is no **partial homomorphism** from D to $\exists X. \mathcal{A}$ at u .

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Partial Homomorphism

It is like a **homomorphism**, but the mapping only maps nodes of the syntax tree of D that are between **the root and a “cut”**.

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Complexity of Safety for Singleton Policies (SAC'21)

Safety of a qABox for singleton \mathcal{EL} policies is in P

Canonical safe anonymizations $\exists Z.C$ of $\exists X.A$ w.r.t. $\{P\}$ covers each $\{P\}$ -safe anonymization of $\exists X.A$.

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Analogous to the computation of canonical compliant anonymizations, but:

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- ▶ each variable is of the form $y_{u,\mathcal{K}}$, but \mathcal{K} is not a repair type, it's just a subset of \mathcal{EL} atoms.
- ▶ there is an additional mechanism to avoid partial homomorphisms

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Results of the Computation (SAC '21)

There is **only one optimal safe anonymization** of $\exists X.A$ w.r.t. $\{P\}$ and computing this can be done in **exponential time**

Using a similar idea as the computation of optimized compliant anonymizations

Theorem (NEW!)


The optimized safe anonymization of $\exists X.\mathcal{A}$ w.r.t. $\{P\}$ is **equivalent** to the canonical safe anonymization of $\exists X.\mathcal{A}$ w.r.t. $\{P\}$

Smaller Optimal Safe Anonymizations

Using a similar idea as the computation of optimized compliant anonymizations

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


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Complexity of the Problem

Expressing general policies by singleton policies using TBoxes

- ▶ Safety problem for singleton policies is **at least as hard as** safety for general policies when TBoxes are considered
- ▶ The safety problem for general policies w.r.t. static \mathcal{EL} TBoxes is in **coNP**.

Our work **reviewed results** from

- ▶ Baader, Kriegel, Nuradiansyah, Peñaloza, *Computing Compliant Anonymisations of Quantified ABoxes w.r.t. \mathcal{EL} Policies*, ISWC '20
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and **presented new results** in the topic of safety with and without TBoxes.

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Possible Future Work:

- ▶ Safety w.r.t. general policies and/or (cycle-restricted) TBoxes
- ▶ Safety w.r.t. a finite set of concept assertions $\{P_1(a_1), \dots, P_n(a_n)\}$